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• In 2013, Internet2 leadership and board of trustees were concerned by the increasing 
sophistication of attacks
• Internet2 did not have a security program in place designed to defend the national 
R&E network from attack
• Many NRENs do not have mature security programs in place
• In early 2014, Internet2 created the role of Chief Cyberinfrastructure Security officer to 
develop and lead a security program that would protect the national R&E network and 
its members 
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SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH
1. Gathered information
– NIST SP 800-53 Security & Privacy Controls – Moderate (268 questions)
– Technical interviews of engineers
– Reviewed logs, policies, configurations, visited PoPs, Internet2 and Level3 NOCs
2. Identified threats and vulnerabilities
3. Analyzed risks and proposed corrective actions
4. Presented findings to leadership for decisions


























































































High Threat Potential Initial Current Target
Security Assessment and Authorization






System, Communications and Availability Protection 
System and Information Integrity
Access Control 
Awareness and Training







System and Services Acquisition Ref: NIST SP 800-53
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SHORT TERM IMPROVEMENTS
• Reduced the number of staff from 100 to 28 that have administrative privileges to 
network systems (routers/switches/controllers)
• Improved user authentication by using two-factor authentication on the network 
systems (routers/ switches/controllers)
• Removed operationally sensitive information (e.g., IP addresses of AuthN servers) 
from public view
• Designed an out-of-band secure management network
• Dedicated security team formed
• Developed security operations capabilities including security log analysis
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SHORT TERM IMPROVEMENTS CONTINUED
• Developed quarterly procedure to review ACLs for in-band management and removed 
over half of stale entries during the first review
• Credentialed scanning of NOC servers and core packet forwarding systems (i.e., 
routers and switches) 
• Consistent ticketing of DDoS attacks as security tickets
• ARP spoof monitoring in public exchanges




• Security awareness education for staff based on SANS Securing the Human
• Periodic security assessments performed
• Implementation of out-of-band secure management network
• Promote adoption of improved routing security methods (e.g., GTSM, RPKI, BCP38)
• Improve physical security at physical sites
• DDoS mitigation (strategy at http://www.internet2.edu/blogs/detail/12234)





xntpd[21521]: sendto(<Target IP>): No route to host
xntpd[21521]: too many recvbufs allocated (40)
NTP REFLECTION DOS ATTACK FROM A MISCONFIGURED ROUTER
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MIRAI PORT SCANNING SCANNING
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IPV4 DISCARDS BY SOURCE ASN AND DEST PORT
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DISCARDS MINUS DNS, BFD, BGP
IPv4
IPv6
